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2013 NATIONAL LAWYERS CONVENTION:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
FREE MARKETS, AND COMPETITION POLICY
Panelists:
John F. Duffy, Samuel H. McCoy II Professor of Law and Armistead M.
Dobie Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law
Richard A. Epstein, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York
University School of Law; and James Parker Hall Distinguished Service
Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School
Joshua D. Sarnoff, Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law
Joshua D. Wright, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commissioner; and
Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law
Moderator:
Hon. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Senior Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit; and Professor of Law, George Mason
University School of Law
Thursday, November 14, 2013
2 to 3:30 p.m.
The Mayflower Hotel
Washington, D.C.
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: I’m Doug Ginsburg, and I’m just
moderating this. Now that I’ve got you all moderated, we have a program
with four speakers, and we are starting seven minutes late, but we have to
end on time, so we are going to begin in one moment.
The biographies of our panelists are in your program materials, so we’re not
going to spend time on that. I can assure you that all of them, without any
known exception, attended college and then also went to law school.
[Laughter.]
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: Some of them did other things after
that; others not. It doesn’t matter. They’re here now.
[Laughter.]
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JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: We are going to go in alphabetical
order—which means I’m out of turn already—starting with John Duffy.
Maybe it’s by age. I don’t know, John.
[Laughter.]
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: The microphone will expire in
twelve minutes.
JOHN F. DUFFY: Twelve minutes, okay.
The topic of our panel today is competition in the patent system, and I want
to begin with a very basic point about the patent system. It often is said—and
you can find many, many sources that say this—that patent system is a
restriction on competition, and I think that that is fundamentally wrong. The
patent system provides a structure for competition, and that’s an enormously
different function. It is not designed to create monopolies. There was a time,
perhaps a brief period of time in England, when patents or letters patent were
just given out on existing products and were designed to raise prices of
existing products and benefit certain groups or individuals who curried favor
with the Crown. But that’s not the way our patent system works.
Basic features of our patent system ensure that the system fosters
competition. First of all, the system always permits free entry into the race to
obtain patents. Patent systems encourage technological races to invent, and
that is one of the major benefits of the patent system. There is a constant
competition to get technology sooner. As my writings have emphasized,
racing to obtain patent rights also has a benefit that many people forget
about, which is that the sooner that the technology is patented, the sooner it
enters into the public domain.1
Patent terms are strictly limited, with rights terminating twenty years from
filing of the patent application (with occasionally some additional time to
make up for unreasonable administrative delays). Because the patent system
awards rights to the inventor who is earliest to file, it also tends to award
rights to the inventor whose patent rights will expire first. That means that
the race to obtain patents is really a race to place things into the public
domain as soon as possible and thereby to enrich the public domain as
quickly as possible. The patent system is therefore not designed to restrict the
public domain. It is instead designed to foster the enrichment of the public
domain.
1
John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
439, 444 (2004) (theorizing that a “race to claim patent rights becomes a race to diminish the
patentee’s rents by dedicating the invention to the public sooner”).
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The patent system’s competitive structure has a very specific implication for
current policy debates. There are some scholars who have tried to measure
the benefits of the patent system by looking at the effect of patents on the
profits of companies that obtain patents.2 The conclusion of these scholars is
that, in many fields, the costs of the patent system to companies—including
litigation costs when they get sued for infringing other patents—outweigh
any benefits that the companies receive from their patents. The implication
drawn from the data is that the patent system is a failure for society. Those
scholars, however, disclaim any attempt to measure the social benefits from
the new inventions produced as a result of the patent system—i.e., the
consumer surplus that arises because of the new inventions.3 It’s very hard to
measure a consumer surplus that arises from innovation, so the approach of
ignoring consumer benefits is like the old joke about someone who, having
lost a set of keys in one place, begins looking for the keys elsewhere because
the light is better there.
The benefits of the patent system are never going to be found in the profits of
private companies. That’s not the right way to measure the benefits of the
system because the patent system is not designed to benefit private firms.4
Whether a patent system exists or not, private firms in a competitive
economy are most likely to obtain normal economic profits. Competition
between the firms will destroy any potential super-competitive profits.
The beneficiaries of the patent system are not private companies. The
beneficiaries are instead the public, which obtains better technology sooner,
and the public domain, which obtains the technology when the patent
expires. So that’s something very important to remember in terms of thinking
about the relationship between competition and the patent system. The patent
system creates competition for patents, and that competition is directed
toward enriching the public, and the public domain, with new technologies as
soon as possible.
The second point I wanted to talk about today is a point that is frequently,
and I think incorrectly, asserted about patents. Indeed, Justice Breyer made
the assertion just a few years ago in an oral argument at the Supreme Court.
He asserted that “There are actually four things in the patent law which
everyone accepts.”5 He then listed favorable and negative things about the
2

JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (Princeton 2008).
3
Id. at 95 (specifically stating that the methodology does not attempt “to
estimate the entirety of social benefits and social costs of the patent system”).
4
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511
(1917) (correctly observing that “the primary purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of
private fortunes”).
5
Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (No.
08-964).
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patent system, and one key negative he listed was that patents allow
inventors to “charge a higher price.”6
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: Oh, God.
JOHN F. DUFFY: Well, okay.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: Explain this.
JOHN F. DUFFY: I need to explain it. Okay. So this point is asserted very
often, and the key flaw is this: the assertion that patents raise prices assumes
that the patented technology would exist anyway, even if there were no
patent system. But if the technology would exist anyway, then, of course, it
is true that society should not allow a patent on that technology. In other
words, if society could obtain some technological development without
offering a patent for it, then society should not want to permit a patent on
that development.
Now, in fact, current law has a doctrine codified in the statute, which says
that if an invention is so easy to think up—so “obvious,” in the words of the
statute—then the invention cannot be patented.7 The Supreme Court has held
that the goal of this statutory “non-obviousness” requirement is to limit
patents only to “those inventions which would not be disclosed or devised
but for the inducement of a patent.”8
So the assertion that patents raise prices assumes that, without patents, the
technology would have existed anyway, and that the patent raises the price of
a technology that would otherwise have been available at a lower price. That
assumption is, I think, fundamentally inconsistent with current statutory law
and current Supreme Court precedent. I have a large article on this in the
Yale Law Journal from a couple years ago playing out the implications of
that insight and suggesting ways in which current doctrine could perhaps be
modified to enforce the non-obviousness in better and more nuanced ways.9
But the point I want to emphasize here is that, when you hear the assertion
that patents raise prices, you should realize that the assertion is making a
fundamental error about the legal structure of the patent system. Moreover,
that error is directly related to the relationship between competition and
patents, for the patent system is directed not toward limiting competition
(and thus raising prices) on technologies that society would have anyway,

6

Id.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
8
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966).
9
Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of
Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590 (2011).
7
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but instead toward fostering competition to produce technologies that,
without a patent system, society would not yet have.
The last point that I want to make in my dwindling number of minutes here is
that, because the patent system is designed to induce the creation and
disclosure of a certain kind of information, policymakers must appreciate
both the type of information that the patent system is designed to produce,
and the ways in which such information can be disclosed.
The patent system is designed to produce technical information that is
relatively easy to disseminate. That sort of information can have large public
benefits and also certain “public good” aspects. By public good aspects, I
mean that the information is something that, in the absence of intellectual
property rights, other people could relatively easily appropriate. The theory
of the patent system is that, because such information can be relatively easily
appropriated by others, the incentive to produce the information would be
inefficiently low in the absence of intellectual property rights.
The Supreme Court and our current legal doctrine holds that the goal of the
patent system is to foster the disclosure of this type of information—i.e.,
disclosure of information that would not be produced or would be held in
secret in the absence of the patent system. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated that disclosure is the “quid pro quo” for obtaining property
rights.10 I want to emphasize one important caveat: if disclosure is the goal,
or even one of the goals, of today’s patent system (and I think it is at least a
goal of the system), then our courts and other policymaking institutions need
to have realistic conceptions of both how information can be disclosed and
also what type of information can be disclosed through the patent system.
Information disclosure can actually be very, very difficult. Disclosure does
not occur merely by handing someone a bunch of papers and saying, “the
papers disclose the information so now you know it.” Meaningful disclosure
of information requires teaching, and indeed patent lawyers and judges often
talk in term about the “teachings” of a patent. An emphasis on teaching is
correct, but judges and lawyers must appreciate that teaching is not easy. It’s
time consuming. It’s difficult. I know this firsthand, because I’ve had the
experience of going through an entire semester trying my best to teach the
material from my casebook, and then at the end of the semester, I read the
exams and realize that—
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: Bad casebook.

10

See, e.g., Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 322 U.S. 471,

484 (1944).

Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2014

5

Hamline Law Review, Vol. 37 [2014], Iss. 3, Art. 4

528

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:523

JOHN F. DUFFY: —I have not been entirely successful.
[Laughter.]
JOHN F. DUFFY: No, no. That’s my casebook. I wasn’t talking about your
casebook.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: Oh. Oh.
JOHN F. DUFFY: Yours, I have no trouble with.
Given the difficulties of disclosure—of teaching—I think we do need some
rethinking of precisely how patents lead to disclosure of information. Patent
law once had an old doctrine, on which I have just written an article, called
the paper patent doctrine.11 Under that doctrine, generally speaking, mere
paper patents—patents that were never practiced and that perhaps didn’t
even teach very well within their paper pages—were disfavored in the patent
system as compared to patents on inventions that had been practiced in a
business where an inventor or an entrepreneur taught the invention to a
workforce, and to the public, by example.
It turns out that this doctrine was not an anti-patent doctrine. It was an
incredibly balanced doctrine. If you were to look at all appellate cases
involving the doctrine—and there about 140 of such appellate cases—you
would find that the cases divide almost equally, with about half of the cases
involving accused infringers who were using the doctrine to challenge the
validity of patents that were being asserted against them, and the other half
involving inventors who were invoking the doctrine to sustain the validity of
their own patents.
In the latter set of cases, an inventor was typically being confronted with a
host of old prior art patents, and accused infringer or the Patent Office was
asserting that the inventor’s claim to a patent was not valid because the
invention was not novel or was obvious in light of the older patents. In such
cases, the inventor could invoke the paper patent doctrine and argue that the
prior art patents, if they had not been practiced, should be viewed as mere
paper patents that should be interpreted narrowly and be viewed as disclosing
little reliable information. In this way, the paper patent doctrine could be
used not only in anti-patent ways (in questioning the scope and validity of
paper patents asserted in infringement litigation), but also in pro-patent ways
(in protecting the patent rights of inventors who actually achieved and
practiced significant technological developments). Such a balanced approach
11

John F. Duffy, Reviving the Paper Patent Doctrine, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1359

(2013).
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is what you’d expect of a rather fundamental doctrine that is designed neither
to restrict nor to expand patent rights, but instead to define more precisely
what patent rights are trying to incentivize.
The central insight of this doctrine, which has been lost to modern law, is
that disclosure is difficult, and that the information that society is trying to
develop with the patent system is not merely stacks of information in paper
files at the Patent Office. Instead, the patent system is trying to develop
innovative technologies being brought to practice—including new
entrepreneurial technologies—and the dissemination and inculcation of that
technological information among a skilled workforce. Those are the real
goals of a patent system, not the mere production of paper patents.
I should note that the paper patent doctrine was very favorable to
entrepreneurs. The doctrine helped people who actually went out and built a
business not only because it made it easier for them to get their patents and
easier to have the validity of their patents sustained, but also because it
protected entrepreneurs from infringement suits by what today we might call
“patent trolls.” By “trolls” here, I am referring to those (i) who obtain patent
(perhaps after many years of prosecution in the Patent Office); (ii) who never
practice the patents themselves or through their licensees; (iii) who wait for
others to do the hard work of actually building successful products; and (iv)
who then asserts against successful entrepreneurs the patents that were never
been practiced according to their terms anywhere.
In the past, such successful entrepreneurs had a defense against such suits.
They could use the paper patent doctrine to protect the fruits of their labors
against unwarranted infringement suits. I think that doctrine should be
revived, and the article I’ve written explains why in greater detail. And since
I’m here at a conservative convention, I should emphasize that it is a
conservative doctrine in the sense that it is an older doctrine forgotten by
modern law. In my view, it reflects older wisdom, and it needs to be revived.
So those are my points, and my time is up, perfectly.
[Applause.]
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: Richard Epstein, you’re next.
Richard has a lot to say and twelve minutes in which to say it. We’ll see what
happens.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: I want to thank my former student, Judge
Douglas Ginsburg for being such a diligent moderator, and I want to thank
John Duffy for using such a wonderful torts casebook.

Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2014

7

Hamline Law Review, Vol. 37 [2014], Iss. 3, Art. 4

530

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:523

It is a real honor to follow John because he is one of the few scholars who
does not raise my blood pressure talking about patents. I count him as one of
the elite.
I want to begin with the 1952 Patent Act, because I think the circumstances
surrounding its adoption tell us a lot about how we should think about patent
reform. The 1952 Patent Act is much better on substance than the peculiar
2011 confection called “the American Invents Act,” whose propaganda-like
title conceals the sorry fact that most of the inventor groups were opposed to
its adoption on many points, including its new “first to file” rule and its
elaborate provisions dealing with patent reexamination and business method
patents. It is striking to compare the processes by which the two statutes
were passed.
The history of the 1952 act is simplicity personified.12 In 1947, President
Harry Truman appointed Pasquale Joseph Federico, then chief patent
examiner of the United States, and Giles Rich, then the leader of the patent
bar, to a committee of two members to draft a new patent act. The decision to
draft it was driven by two considerations. First, the law had not been revised
in a comprehensive fashion since 1836, and second, a number of decisions of
the Supreme Court were widely regarded as being too anti-patent. The two
men worked together for about five years, with little interference or guidance
from outside. Their joint efforts yielded an excellent and balanced statute,
which is in my view far superior to the 2011 Act. The process of its approval
by Congress was simplicity itself. Representative Joseph Bryson, a Democrat
from South Carolina, introduced the bill into Congress. It passed both houses
unanimously and without debate, and was promptly signed into law by
Truman. Its modest title indicates that the entire venture was regarded as
largely technical. Federico continued to serve on the PTO. In 1956 Rich was
appointed by Eisenhower for a seat on the United States Court of Custom
and Patent Appeals, which in 1982 became part of the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. The law went into effect 1953. At a guess, the cost of
getting that law enacted had to have been trivial. All money well spent.
The passage of AIA in 2011 tells a different and more tragic story. Its
complexity stands proof to the proposition that the more parties who have a
say in the outcome of the law, the worse the legislation looks at the back end.
Today, patent law is not a backwater of interest only to engineers and
inventors. It has passed into the mainstream of American legal education.
The scholarship on the topic is vast, and much of it is deeply critical of the
patent-protective nature of the 1952 Act. The new academic concern meshes
with the ever greater importance of patents, and so we see the emergence of a
12

For the essentials, see Giles Rich, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Giles_Rich (last visited Aug. 17, 2013).
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potent public choice dynamic that was conspicuously absent in the run up to
the 1952 Act. Coalitions start to form; experts, like myself, are asked to
prepare exhaustive position papers on various aspects of the case, from an
economic, legal and constitutional point of view. The lobbying on both sides
of every issue is nonstop, and the legislation itself is so convoluted that we
now have the privilege of litigating earlier patents under the 1952 Act, while
having to prepare to file, and eventually litigate new patents under the AIA.
The greater the stakes, the worse the statute. It’s clear from my own
involvement in this particular case that tens of millions, probably much
more, were invested in the full time lobbying efforts on all sides of the issue.
The proposition that we generally draw from this melee is that the ability or
the conscientiousness or the effectiveness or the soundness of a statute is
inverse to the amount of money that it takes to secure passage.
Now, the question then is “Why is it that the old guys got it right when the
new guys get it wrong?” And, I think the way to sort out this morass is to
take the three terms in sequence—intellectual property, free markets, and
competition policy. They are clues to putting any sound patent system
together.
I’m very much of the firm belief that you cannot do patent law unless you
understand a great deal about property law more generally. I don’t think
intellectual property should be read one composite word—intellectualproperty—that is somehow unrelated to property. I think intellectual property
is a subset of standard property law. One of the insights that you draw from
that is the question: “What do we mean by exclusive rights as an ownership
matter as opposed to exclusive rights as a monopoly matter?” If you go to the
real estate cases, you know, Richard Epstein owns a distinct apartment in
downtown Chicago. In a Pickwickian sense, I own a monopoly on that
particular condominium. But, on the other hand, there are lots of other
residences, some condos and some not. These are similar enough that many
are close substitutes for the condo that I own, so the exclusive rights to my
own unit does not confer on me any kind of market power. More generally,
the assertion that simply because you have a monopoly on a particular asset
means that you have market power is demonstrably false with respect to real
estate.
For many reasons, some of which John Duffy mentioned, it is also
demonstrably wrong to assert that broad monopoly claim with respect to
patents. One firm gets a patent on one statin, and it’s in competition with a
number of other drug companies, proprietary and generic, who produce
drugs in exactly the same class. That competition across brands is going to
force prices down. People desperately want to increase the level of profits
that they get from their patents, so they will try to market them as quickly as
possible. Generally speaking, as a matter of social welfare, it is better for a
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patentee to garner monopoly rents for some short period, during which time
consumers also share in the gains. Delaying entry results in either gains for
incumbents in the same class or in the total loss of revenues for pioneer
patents that open new fields. The sooner a drug is put on the market, the
sooner actual and potential competitors gain from the various patent
disclosures, which should increase the likelihood that a new competitor will
enter the market. So, the proper way to control monopoly profits is through a
system that is highly congenial to new entry.
But dangers lurk everywhere. In pharmaceuticals, the FDA poses a serious
threat because of its elaborate requirements for clinical trials, which delay
the entry of drugs that might be superior to those already on the market.
Hence its licensing requirements create monopoly protection that is far more
dangerous than those restraints created by the patent system. Yet all too
often, the strong critics of the patent system pay scant attention to the impact
of the FDA on market innovation.
So then the question is, “Well, how much of our understanding of general
property rights helps in understanding patents?” The obvious carryover is the
importance of exclusive rights for use, which is the hallmark of real and
personal property. The complexity arises because the patent covers a subset
of information—that which explains how some invention or device works—
which once available can be used by others at zero cost, without denying its
use to the original inventor. At some point the information can be included in
the public domain, where access is open to all on equal terms.
The issue is what do we do with this insight. Well, the first point that
becomes clear is that perpetual ownership, which is the appropriate solution
for land, does not in fact offer an ideal model for intellectual property. The
task, therefore, is to figure out what adaptations to the land model are
necessary to deal with this issue. The basic rule in all cases is make as few
adaptations and modifications of a fundamentally sound system in the law of
real and personal property to remedy this defect.13 In practice, the single
most adaptation is to set term limits on patent lives. The challenge is to
determine the optimal length.
Generally speaking, that time period could be either too long or too short.
For software, there is no need to worry about patent length. Even if that
13

For a more extended treatment, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, WHAT IS SO SPECIAL
ABOUT INTANGIBLE PROPERTY? THE CASE FOR INTELLIGENT CARRYOVERS, COMPETITION
POLICY AND PATENT LAW UNDER UNCERTAINTY: REGULATING INNOVATION 42 (G. Manne & J.
Wright eds. 2011); Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A
Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455 (2010), available
at
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/print/article/disintegration-intellectual-propertyclassical-liberal-response-premature-obituary.
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period were as little as five years, the short business half-lives would render
it obsolete by the end of that truncated period. The key challenge therefore is
how to get patent software into the market as quickly as possible. But, for
pharmaceuticals, patents that are too short will stunt innovation and create
major social costs. Generally speaking, therefore, the prudent strategy is to
move toward the longer side of the patent spectrum. The problem here is
more acute because of the FDA oversight as it interacts with the patent
system, where in effect it shortens the life of valuable patents to around ten
to twelve years, which is probably too short to create optimal incentives for
innovation.
But once that fundamental decision is made on patent length the last thing to
do is to become a Fancy Dan about the other patent attributes. Here are three
important areas to which this insight applies. First, the rules with respect to
patent acquisition. On this point, I think that some patent office examination
is a perfectly good way to start. Indeed, the more reliable that examination,
the more likely it is that the patent system will operate effectively
downstream, both through licensing and further development. It is, therefore,
high social folly that the major blockade in this system stems from
insufficient funding of the PTO, which increases delays on the one hand and
inaccuracies on the other. Yet to make this simple reform—by letting the
PTO keep its own fees—does not require turning the system upside down
with the American Invents Act. The correct level of appropriations that pays
competitive salaries to hire decent patent examiners would do much to solve
this problem.
The second challenge is to make sure that nobody has a built-in incentive to
bypass the system of voluntary licenses. Accordingly, the traditional rule that
allows the patentee to obtain an injunction unless the patentee did something
to forfeit that right, by way of estoppel or laches or contract, was the right
approach with respect to patent remedies. Indeed, ideally, the objective
should not be to order injunctions but to have a system of rights that is so
secure that it will no longer be necessary for anyone to get the injunction,
because potential infringers will know that they are left worse off by seeking
to go around the licensing system.
One common response to this position is that it creates some insoluble holdup problem. But that approach overlooks the reverse hold-up problem, which
is in my view every bit as severe. Historically, that has not proven to be too
great a problem, but that is only because the injunction stopped widespread
abuse before it happened. One of the major difficulties of the modern law in
this area is it doesn’t recognize that there are two forms of peril. Yet
everybody who works with injunctions in real property cases knows that this
problem in fact raises a serious issue. In addition, every real property lawyer
knows that the remedial approach is not limited to the stark choice between

Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2014

11

Hamline Law Review, Vol. 37 [2014], Iss. 3, Art. 4

534

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:523

an injunction and damages. Oftentimes, the law develops a nuanced
approach that starts with injunctions, but then limits their use (often by
delay) and awards damages to soften the harshest aspects of the injunctive
remedy, without creating a patent free-for-all. Yet too, criticisms of eBay are
largely devoid of any analysis of how these intermediate solutions ought to
work.14 A mistake.
The next feature of patent design is to ensure that patents can be freely
licensed on what terms and conditions the parties see fit, subject only to
general constraints of antitrust law and illegality. Essentially, any strong
licensing system increases gains from trade, which in turn increases the gains
from patenting in the first place. So, when the Supreme Court in cases like
Quanta v. LG finds dubious reasons to impose a first-sale rule on licensing, it
reduces the utility of the patent, which in turn dulls innovation.15
On these remedial issues, the real estate rules on injunctions, damages, leases
and licenses work well. There is no reason not to follow them faithfully with
intellectual property. It is always a dangerous approach to say that we have
to weaken injunctions and undermine licenses to correct the supposed defects
of the initial patenting system. The sad truth is that the two errors never
cancel out. They cumulate, making the system worse off than before.
At this point, the advantages of a sound system compound. If the intellectual
property law rules are sound, free markets will have greater scope, as
competition policy can control any monopoly risk across patents. The key
point here is not to worry whether any particular patent creates some
mythical monopoly. The proper target of the antitrust laws is collusion
between two patentees in order to raise price or reduce access. So, if all the
statins manufacturers got together to restrict output and raise prices through,
say, a single marketing agency, that’s a serious antitrust violation. Indeed, for
the most part, the patent pooling rules from the 1990s, which allow parties to
pool complements but not substitutes, makes a very sensible
accommodation.16 Pooling complements tends to eliminate double
marginalization whereby multiple interrelated patents could blockade one
another. In contrast, pooling substitutes is the path to cartel formation. The
only measure that is needed to keep these markets in perfect equilibrium is to
understand that the competition policy is just the plain old antitrust rule as
applied to patents.

14

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs, Inc., 128 U.S. 617 (2008).
16
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING
OF
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
(Apr.
6,
1995),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ guidelines/0558.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2014).
15

http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol37/iss3/4

12

Duffy et al.: Intellectual Property Panel

2014]

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PANEL

535

So what does this start to tell us? To me, it says that one of the great
tragedies of modern times is we have too much scholarship with respect to
intellectual property.
[Laughter.]
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: The problem with this scholarship deepens
because it becomes deeply introspective. It then puts this elegant structure
under a microscope in order to examine its every pore and deformity. It thus
blows up its inevitable weaknesses far out of proportion. What the critics
need to do is to take a tranquilizer, to relax, and to look at the overall
situation in order to realize that the obsession with patent trolls has been
around for a generation. Yet on the ground, the patent system, at least until
2011, worked well. It is wrong to overstate the difficulties that are inherent in
any system when its basic contours are consistent with fundamental
economic logic of all property systems. The lack of an appreciation of how
property functions generally has impaired our understanding of the patent
system. Count me as a dissenter from the modern establishment consensus
on patent law. Thank you.
[Applause.]
JOSHUA D. SARNOFF: So first, I want to thank the Federalist Society for
inviting me. It’s a particular privilege to be on the panel with such
distinguished experts on these issues. I haven’t written on those issues, so I
won’t refer you to my published works, but if you want to look at some of
my published works on patent law, they indeed will raise your blood
pressure. But, what I’m about to say will certainly raise Professor Epstein’s,
so hopefully, he can stay calm until everything is over.
I am going to actually start as my foil, the guy on my left, your right, Josh
Wright, who is writing about the role of antitrust and regulating patent
assertion, which he’s commonly referred to as “patent trolls.” Antitrust is not
a form of comprehensive price regulation; rather, the antitrust laws are
concerned with conduct that reduces competition. Changes in pricing
incentives that do not arise from changes in competition are outside the
appropriate scope of antitrust. And I am happy as an unrepentant liberal,
adoptedly visiting Chicago, not a member of the Chicago School, to say that
patent law and antitrust law are back in the business of price regulation. To
quote the subtitle of my favorite movie, Dr. Strangelove: It’s time to learn
“to stop worrying and love the bomb.”17

17
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So first, if you look at patent law doctrine itself, it turns out that in certain
specific cases, judges are valuing the patent infringement right itself, and that
requires court intervention and, thus, price regulation. When does this occur?
Well, it typically occurs in the context where you have infringement by a
direct competitor. Normally, we assume that in those circumstances, there is
a premise of irreparable harm that should grant an injunction. And, this is
why? Because in most circumstances outside the context of standards bodies,
and a few other things like patent pools, which I’ll come to later, we assume
direct competitors will not license each other.
However, what is the damages remedy? Well, first, you get your damages for
lost profits, but on top of that you get a remedy for reasonable royalties on
the licenses you would have never made. This is not economic evaluation of
harm to the patent holder, therefore, nor is it unjust enrichment,
disgorgement of the patentee’s profits. It’s valuation of an intrusion on a
government-granted legal right, which doesn’t in fact harm the patent holder,
except in regard to potential revenues they wouldn’t have made anyway. So
what are we doing? We’re basically giving it to a jury, just like “what’s an
arm worth?” when there isn’t a market there.
Of necessity, the government has to set a fair price. The fair price does so
through a highly flawed jury system that looks to this counter-factual world
of ex ante negotiations under the Georgia Pacific standard in a context where
they assume royalty rates are going to be based on judgments about the
patent itself.18 Well, the patent itself, for the purpose of this hypothetical and
unrealistic royalty is assumed to be both valid and infringed. And of course,
in any bilateral ex ante negotiation, there is some probability it will not be
valid, nor will it be infringed. That just gets thrown out of this calculation
when determining reasonableness, and we try to set a value on the product
itself and a value for the patent. This is particularly difficult in regard to
trying to figure out the inventive contribution of a small component to a
larger system that’s sold, and I’ll come back to that later. It also raises the
difficult issue of royalty stacking when multiple patents are involved in the
ultimate products that are sold, but only one person is suing another.
Okay, so much for basic patent law. Let’s turn to antitrust and its relation to
the patent litigation system. We now have these settlements, particularly in
the context of drugs, which Professor Epstein again pointed to, where
pioneering and branded drugs are paying generic companies to stay off the
market. It’s through an advanced notice—advanced new drug application,
they can get approval to get onto the market within thirty months unless there
is an injunction out of the court to keep them off the market, and the patent
18

Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp, 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y.
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suit is resolved. This is big money, and often these days, as the FTC has been
complaining, big money is changing hands, because what they are effectively
doing is delaying entry of the generic, keeping the super-monopoly prices,
and therefore transferring some of the value—in some cases even more value
than the generic could have made if they entered the market just to delay
entry—which is bad both for competition and of course for consumers.
Obviously, this raises a difficult question: “What’s the appropriate way to
look at these things?” And, some courts had adopted what was called the
“scope of the patent” test for antitrust immunity, which said that if what was
being done is exclusion that’s within the scope of the patent rights, then of
course, you could settle on any terms you like. Thankfully, the Supreme
Court has seen the wisdom of reversing that and gone to a difficult rule-ofreason analysis in the recent Actavis case under a Section 1, Sherman Act,
restraint of trade approach.19
Questions will now obviously arise not just in the case where money goes
back and forth to the generic, but also, you just simply have a pay-for-delay
in the form of non-entry, and maybe the generic then will get back into the
market at a later time, earlier than the patent would have expired. And
somebody is going to have to value what were the comparative benefits of
the settlement, what value changed hands. And who is going to do that
valuation? The government, also known as people like the gentleman to my
immediate left, your right—judges who are going to take these cases, who
are going to have to make these difficult decisions.
So just to give you a concrete example from Actavis, Solvay, which had
patented AndroGel sued Actavis, now Watson, certified under this paragraph
four procedure that the patent was invalid. It got its ANDA approval after
thirty months. Another generic, Paddock, filed an ANDA. Another generic
called Par agreed to share litigation costs. They entered into a settlement.
Actavis agreed not to enter in the market for about sixty-five months before
patent expiration and to promote AndroGel. Paddock and Par made similar
agreements. $12 million went from Solvay to Paddock, $60 million to Par,
and somewhere between $19 and $30 million annually for nine years to
Actavis.
Normally, when you don’t have the problem of delay onto the market
because of the regulatory over-structure, people aren’t going to be spending
money to have the person suing them go away. Normally, it goes the other
way. Money changes hands the other way. In any event, the court says in the
context of this stuff:

19

FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
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Given these factors, it would be incongruous to
determine antitrust legality by measuring the settlement’s
anticompetitive effects solely against patent law policy,
rather than by measuring them against procompetitive
antitrust policies as well . . . . [T]his court has indicated that
patent and antitrust policies are both relevant in determining
the ‘scope of the patent monopoly’—and consequently
antitrust law immunity—that is conferred by a patent . . . .
Similarly, both within the settlement context and without,
the court has struck down overly restrictive patent licensing
agreements—irrespective of whether those agreements
produce supra-patent-permitted revenues . . . . It would be
difficult to reconcile the proposed right [to settle on any
terms] with the patent-related policy of eliminating
unwarranted patent grants so the public will now
“continually be required to pay tribute to would-be
monopolists . . . .”20
So I’m going to hurry and leave most of the discussion, which I assume can
be addressed by former Professor Wright, on the ways we are now going to
have to make these difficult decisions. But the main thing is that courts are
now going to have to balance two things: what the value was being
exchanged, and they will inevitably have to weigh the likelihood that the
patent challenge was going to be successful. And there is simply no way to
avoid it, because you don’t know whether or not what you were actually
exchanging is a valid challenge which would have freed the public entirely
or something else, which is an effort to basically restrict the market.
Finally, I’m going to turn to enforcing contractual standard-setting
organization commitments for FRAND royalties. Again, as Josh Wright has
argued, one needs to consider these commitments in the context of
incomplete contracting that’s sufficient, because of the lack of ability to
determine prices ex ante and the need to coordinate technology. For these
types of things, we now have a decision out of Judge Robart in the Microsoft
v. Motorola case.21 I won’t go through the facts. I’ll just give you two basic
premises. Motorola offered Microsoft royalties at 2.5% of the end price of
the products. The judge ultimately set the royalties at .555 cents per unit,
substantially lower. And the assumption that’s behind this is that the FRAND
royalty, as a contractual matter, required that the judges enforcing contracts
determined what was a fair offer, because you had to have a good faith offer,
and when the good faith offer had not been made, to actually set a reasonable
royalty. That’s what RAND stands for, and the court tries to lay out some
20
21

Id. at 2231–33.
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economic guideposts. What are these economic guideposts for RAND? Well,
ultimately, we go back to the Georgia Pacific factors, which I started with,
and so what you’re going to have happen, of course, now is when these
standard-setting bodies predictively and necessarily can’t reach agreement,
we’ll now have to go to the judges to set what is supposed to be a
multilateral decision, which includes royalty-stacking considerations, which
includes the obligation to license in good faith in this ex ante negotiation.
That judge-based determination will then inform what people do privately.
So it’s really the judges again determining what the fair price is, which will
then filter into the market and filter back again.
So one thing that one could hope is that the private sector of these SSO
bodies will take this on their own and take it out of the courts or put it into
arbitration and take it out of the courts. Of course, when they take it on
themselves, then we get price-fixing concerns. So there is no way to avoid
this problem.
Finally, I just want to add that more attention may need to be given to market
definition. There’s some good recent scholarship, which seems to suggest
that in IP areas, the entire market may actually be in the patent itself or the
trademark, etc. The question comes up: How much would you pay to
substitute Coke for Pepsi? And it turns out that it doesn’t meet normal
substitution analysis of a few cents or, you know, a couple of percentage
points that people will substitute. People really care about Coke.
Given that, we need to think about what types of innovation-enhancing
approaches we can have, and if the markets really are much narrower than
we think, then we should be much more concerned about action within the
scope of the patent right. That brings us back to misuse and other doctrines,
which Actavis seems to suggest should be relooked at.
Finally, I’ll end by quoting from some more recent scholarship from a guy
named G.F. Hegel, “The differing interests of producers and consumers may
come into collision with each other, and although a fair balance between
them on the whole may be brought about automatically, still their adjustment
also requires a control which stands above both and is consciously
undertaken.”22 Let’s learn to love price regulation, because it’s here anyway.
We’ll do it. Let’s just try to do it better.
Thank you.
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: Thank you, Josh.
22

GEORG W. F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 236 (T. M. Knox trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 1967).
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[Applause.]
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: Now for something completely
different.
[Laughter.]
JOSHUA D. WRIGHT: Former Professor Wright on leave, which means
I’m now a Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission, and I see
cameras, which usually means before I talk, I say something like the things I
say attribute to people—don’t attribute to people other than me at the
Commission, especially the other commissioners.
JOSHUA D. SARNOFF: I always just say they’re not even my own views.
[Laughter.]
JOSHUA D. WRIGHT: Yeah. So occasionally, I do that, and in this case
and also when I have the pleasure of following Richard on a panel, I usually
get to be brief, I say, “What Richard said,” and I sit down. And, in this case
and particularly the point about when it comes antitrust analysis of
intellectual property rights, the economic tools that have been developed in
standard antitrust analysis and the doctrines that have been developed in
standard antitrust analysis, I think, are right for the job and do not call for
any sort of particularized exception or special approach. And it may—for the
record, the standard approach also works for Coke and Pepsi.
So instead of talking about the general relationship between antitrust and IP,
I thought—because I would just say, “Hey, what Richard said,” I thought I
would talk about a couple of things going on in the intellectual property and
antitrust sphere at the Federal Trade Commission, and in the interest of time,
I will pick two.
The first is—there’s been some mention of trolls, PAEs, whatever the
moniker of the day is you would like to use, and the FTC, as some of you
know, has sent out for public comment its notice and request for comments
on a proposal to use its 6(b) authority to study patent assertion entities. The
debate around PAEs is well known. Policymakers and commentators have
been very critical. There is a great deal of scholarship surrounding patent
trolls, some presuming they do more harm than good, some presuming they
do more good than harm, far more of the former than the latter. This is a
place where the Federal Trade Commission historically in areas that have
been sort of devoid of empirical fact, but full of very strong priors has been, I
think, productive in using its research authority and its capabilities, a
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wonderful team of full-time economists over there, to get data and go to
work and try to provide some answers that might be useful.
So, the types of things that the study tries to answer as laid out in the
proposed notice are things I would categorize with my economist hat on as
largely descriptive analysis: how are PAEs organized in terms of legal
structure, differences in patterns and types of ownership compared to
practicing entities, how does acquisition take place, what about comparing
licensing activities, and, as one might guess in any sort of study, looking at
those types of questions, maybe with an eye at getting toward the ultimate
cost and benefits of those questions, the idea is to take and collect data with
your group of interests, in this case PAEs, and also some other similarly
situated firms. So, you might be able to make some comparisons that you can
learn from and inform the public debate. Whether the data collected will
ultimately prove useful for that purpose, the descriptive purpose, I’m quite
sure it will, but more broadly than that, we’ll see. This is the trick about
collecting data.
The public comment period closes for that project on December 2nd, so your
comments are welcome. And for now, I think with respect to the PAE study,
I would simply say for the agency, one of the things that the Federal Trade
Commission, when I had my professor hat on and spent a good amount of
time criticizing a variety of their activities, studying stuff is something that
the Commission does really well. Working with data and collecting data is
something that they do well and are historically very careful with, and I think
this is an area that—I think “devoid” is the word I used before, and I’ll stick
to it—an area that is fairly devoid of empirical work. So I think the
Commission is well served to act here in terms of doing the study.
I will spend the rest of the time talking about reverse payments. So the
Supreme Court handed down Actavis not too long ago. The backdrop, of
course, was that the Federal Trade Commission had, for at least a decade
starting with the former Chairman Muris and through Chairman Leibowitz
and continuing now, long held the position that “pay-for-delay settlements,”
I will call them, between brand and generic competitors, as Professor Sarnoff
described them, were per se unlawful. That had been the position of the
Commission for quite some time. It was a debated position. There were folks
saying that the right way to approach reverse payment settlements was with
the rule of reason, and folks taking a variety of intermediate positions
between sort of the full-blown rule of reason and treatment of per se
illegality.
The Supreme Court held that—and I think quite firmly and clearly—that
reverse payments would be analyzed under the traditional rule of reason. The
state of play prior to the decision was some circuits adopting the scope of the
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patent test, which Josh described, so I’ll move on from that other than to
come back to one interesting point about the extent to which questions about
the validity of the patent will arise within the standard antitrust analysis. This
is, in my view—again, disclaimer thing, speaking for myself—this is, in my
view, pretty clearly a partial victory and a partial defeat for the FTC. One of
the positions taken through the scope of the patent test and other areas was
that the settlement, reverse settlements ought to be per se lawful. To harken
back to Richard’s earlier comments, the standard antitrust analysis, that
would almost certainly not be the case for any sort of horizontal agreement
that had some of the features that these settlements can have. There’s clearly
some threat, potential threat to competition, the standard antitrust analysis
when we have things that can potentially threaten competition, but may also
be efficient, is to apply the rule of reason and to test the various
anticompetitive and pro-competitive theories against the facts on the ground
and ask whether the agreements actually confer some market power to the
collective parties that would not exist otherwise.
The Actavis decision does precisely that. It rejects per se treatment. It rejects
scope of the patent test or something close to per se legality, and so what we
have is a decision that endorses the rule of reason. There is considerable
debate over what precisely the contours of that rule-of-reason analysis will
be. So many commentators, for example, have said, “Yes, the Supreme Court
said this is not a so-called ‘quick-look rule of reason,’” one of these
intermediate forms where we may say we are doing the rule of reason but
wink at each other and summarily condemn the restraint. The Supreme Court
said, “We are not doing that thing. We are doing something else. We are
doing the traditional rule of reason.” They laid out some factors to consider,
and one that got a lot of ink was the size of the payment, with an underlying
theory of economic logic that the larger the payment, the weaker the
underlying patent is likely to be, and so the Supreme Court said, “We’ll look
at the things we look at in a normal rule-of-reason analysis, but, hey, pay
special attention to the size of the payment.”
Some have said, “Ah, what they really meant is if the payment is big, we
summarily condemn the agreement à la quick-look rule of reason.” I think a
closer read of the opinion, even a kind of, sort of, close read of the opinion
suggests that that approach is wrong. I think, instead, what a move from per
se legality or per se illegality towards the rule of reason means is something
like what it is meant in every other area of antitrust law that has moved from
per se treatment to the rule of reason: more rigorous economic analysis, more
attention to economic evidence rather than less.
This, of course, will—and I don’t think we actually disagree on this point at
all—this will require looking at the size of the payment and deciding what
inferences to draw from that to determine whether there has been harm to
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competition. Whether one labels that price regulation, I think would be the
thing that I would fight over, but I don’t think there’s much time to do that.
The idea that an antitrust court sometimes looks at prices is different to say
that we put in orders that fix prices or that—so far as I know, Trinko23 and
NYNEX24 and Rambus25 are all still the law of the land in the case of
unilateral refusal to deal and throughout Section 2, which all say something
akin to, “the monopolist gets the price the way it wants to price.”
Now, if it does something, which is monopoly power, to further harm
competition, that’s an antitrust problem. That analysis sometimes looks at
prices, or prices relative to cost, or changes in prices. To infer whether
market power has been achieved, I think follows from standard economic
logic but doesn’t require price regulation in the sense of the word that—at
least as I understand it.
I think back to Actavis for two closing points. I think there are two really
important live questions. Lower courts haven’t got their hands on postActavis rule-of-reason reverse payment cases yet, and I think there are two
important questions. The court says size of the payment really matters. So
what constitutes, as the court said, a large and unjustified payment? The
court says it makes it more likely a settlement is illegal, not necessarily
illegal, but more likely.
So what is large and unjustified? You hand that part of the opinion to
anybody who has done any economics or statistics in their life, they will say,
“Large and unjustified compared to what? How are we going to measure
largeness and the lack of justification?”
It is difficult for me to fathom that that analysis won’t bring more economic
rigor to understanding the incentives to enter these settlements than less. One
thing you could do is compare to the expected litigation cost. You can try to.
I think one easy prediction about the cases is that the settlements will get
more complicated. They will have more features. It will be more difficult to
tease out what is being paid for what. But exactly how courts will structure
what to do with the size of the payment, I think is an open question. That’s
one of the very important ones that I think will be resolved fairly quickly.
The second interesting question—and Professor Sarnoff got at this a little
bit—is what to do about patent validity within the antitrust analysis. There is
a vigorous dissent in the opinion that adopts the logic—and there’s certainly
23

(2004).

Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398
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NYNEX Corp., v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998).
Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 218 F.2d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 227 (2003).
25
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some intuitive appeal to it—that, were the patent valid, the patent holder has
a right to exclude, and a lesser offense of paying somebody to delay entry is
certainly sort of within the rights of a valid patent holder. So there could be
no harm to competition in the sense meant by the antitrust laws if we knew
with certainty that the patent was valid.
The majority rejects the scope of the patent test, and yet and still, under the
more fulsome rule-of-reason analysis endorsed by the majority, I find—and
this is my prediction—and five dollars may get you a cup of coffee—but my
prediction is that lower courts adopting this more fulsome rule-of-reason
analysis will be very much inclined to consider the potential validity of the
patent, and with a Supreme Court decision that says, “Defendant, you are
entitled to the full-blown rule of reason. You are entitled to put forth
justifications for your settlement, justifications that may well include validity
of the patent or other things,” it is hard for me to imagine that the ultimate
equilibrium of the sort of rule that arises in the lower courts will be one that
turns a blind eye to the potential validity of the patent. That, I think remains
to be seen, but will be something that I think will be an important fork in the
road for the development of these cases, and I’m sure one that the
Commission itself will be watching closely as they’ve got a couple of
pending cases and I am quite certain plan to bring a couple more.
So I will stop there.
[Applause.]
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: Okay. John Duffy, my impersonation
of a potted plant is over.
[Laughter.]
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: If you want to take a minute or
possibly two with cross-comments, you may do so.
JOHN F. DUFFY: I do have one cross-comment that I find irresistible, and
I think everybody in this room is going to figure out why it’s irresistible,
because I’m going to be on the right of Richard Epstein. I’m literally on his
right, but I’m going to be also metaphorically on his right.
He said in his speech the one thing he would recommend is doubling the
appropriation of the Patent and Trademark Office. That, I have to take issue
with. I think it’s a standard liberal solution to say, when a government
agency is not performing well: “What should we do with it? Oh, it would
work very well if we just doubled the agency’s appropriation.”
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Now, let me tell you what’s wrong with the Patent and Trademark Office.
Examiners spend on average about twenty hours looking over a patent
application, but I don’t think the amount of time devoted to examination is
the real problem. Let’s assume that twice that—forty hours—is what’s
necessary to examine an application. Still, even if the time spent on
examination is doubled, that does not necessarily mean that the Patent Office
will do a good job in examining the application.
Remember what the Patent Office provides is expert services—it provides an
expert opinion. An issued patent is not for sure valid. It only has a
presumption of validity. The agency’s opinion gets some weight in court.
Imagine now that you went into the private market to obtain an expert
opinion, and you said, “I need about twenty, thirty, maybe forty hours’ worth
of your time.” That person then replied, “Oh, I can do that for you. I will
charge you a fair price, and I can do it in about 2016—that’s when I think I’ll
get around to it.” You would think, “What’s going on here?” You would
think, “Is this like the Soviet Union?” The only way this kind of poor service
could possibly exist is if this is a monopolized entity. That’s exactly what the
Patent Office is in this country, though not in all other countries.
I have an article on this. It’s called “Ending the Patenting Monopoly.”26 It’s
not entitled “Ending the Patent Monopoly,” because I don’t think there are
patent monopolies, but instead “Ending the Patenting Monopoly,” which is
the USPTO. Other countries don’t do it this way. To get an Israeli patent, for
example, inventors can go to any one of thirteen patent offices throughout
the world, and if they are able to convince one of those offices to issue a
patent, then the Israeli patent office will issue immediately, by operation of
law, an Israeli patent. That’s a step towards competition. I think that our
patent system could have full-blown privatization of the examination
function, as I explain in my article. That’s the free market solution—a
competitive solution.
But if you want the liberal solution, you go to Richard.
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: Why is that competitive? There are
thirteen jurisdictions that could issue patents. How are they competing with
each other?
JOHN F. DUFFY: Actually, in this article, my co-author and I show that
there are clear examples where governmental patent offices are competing on
price and quality of service with other patent offices.27 But the ultimate
26

Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Ending the Patenting Monopoly, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 1541 (2009).
27
Id. at 1569–71 (providing examples of competition between and the patent
offices of individual European countries and the European Patent Office).
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recommendation of the article is that private entities should be allowed to
perform the examination function, obviously with some sort of certification
process to make sure that the private firms are producing quality opinions
about validity. With that kind of minimal regulation of the private firms, we
could have a sector in the economy that engages in examining patent
applications and deciding whether claims to patents are valid or not.
In fact, even now, there is actually a growing set of technology companies
that are trying to figure out whether issued patents are valid or not. There is a
private demand for that because basically the Patent Office’s opinion cannot
be trusted. And so privatization of patenting could generate new technology,
allow for entrepreneurship, and get rid of a government monopoly that is
performing terribly. That’s my solution, but if you want a standard liberal
solution, which is to double the Patent Office’s appropriation, you can talk to
Richard here.
[Laughter.]
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: Richard.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: Well, you are going to have to talk to Richard,
and let me see if I can explain it in a little bit more detail, my position.
First of all, one of the things about situations when you create,
quote/unquote, monopolies in the sense of exclusive rights is that it’s very
difficult to have competitive organizations to license them. It would be like
having to go to thirteen rival parties in order to figure out whether or not a
land title is valid.
The risk in this particular case is you get one country, which says, “We will
now be the Schlock Patent Service. We will give you validity opinions. You
have to license it within our system,” and if it turns out that that guy has very
inferior services, which are attractive to a plaintiff, what you do is you have a
huge externality. So it is not at all clear to me that the multiplicity of parties
is in fact going to be good. Sooner or later, you are going to have to focus on
the question of validity.
Now, John may be right, and I was not—
JOHN F. DUFFY: That’s the race-to-the-bottom theory, just to be clear.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: It is a race-to-the-bottom theory in this particular
context, given the fact that the complication is going to be valid somewhere
else. Now, if it turns out these guys have to live with their decision, so
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Germany is doing it, I think it would be fine, but if it’s the Bahamas or the
Cayman Islands that are doing this, I’m going to get very suspicious.
The point about the money was—I’m sorry, I spoke too briefly—is
obviously you have got to reform the particular operation of the PTO in order
for the situation to improve, but there was this proposal with respect to the
FDA in which if you paid an additional sum of money, you got an expedited
examination, which as best I can tell seemed to work pretty well. Tom
Philipson did a bunch of studies on the statute called PDUFA or the
Prescription Drug User Fee Act and found that essentially the quality of the
review did not go down as the speed of the review started to go up.28
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: Richard, why wouldn’t crummy
patent opinions from Cayman or wherever simply be a plaintiff magnet? So
you wouldn’t want that. You’d want one from Germany or the U.K.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: Well, I mean, it depends on exactly the quality of
the review. I can perfectly believe that this system might work if the local
country has to give full force and effect as it is to receive in the U.S. system.
And obviously, the only way this system will work—and I think it’s
probably the right thing—is to say we care less about what the PTO does and
more about the way in which the courts start to work. I raise this point,
because as you well know, the current situation is to allow the PTO under the
AIA to trump, at least in some circumstances, what it is a district court has
done on the reexamination procedure. I fought that very seriously, because
frankly, I think that’s just the worst possible way to do it, given the way the
adjudication is going through.
So, let me now just modify my system, which is I am perfectly willing to
give more money if I think there is a bottleneck and delay, which is
something that you referred to, but I am not willing to give it
unconditionally. I would want to have some major structural reforms start to
take place in there, and it’s always the—it’s not the “liberal solution,” in any
pejorative sense. There are certain other kinds of cases, I dare say, where we
would like to put a little bit more money in the public side. Certainly, with
respect to the enforcement of real estate titles, you would not want to have a
shoddy system of recordation that could create all sorts of difficulties.
So let me put it to you this way and modify it, because I’m duly chastened—
[Laughter.]

28

21 U.S.C. § 379h(a)(2)(A), (a)(3)(A) (2012).
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RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: —which is I am willing to spend money to make
a system more cost effective, and I think one of the constant complaints with
the patent office is that the money that they raise goes back into the general
treasury. The delay becomes acute, and if in fact you could control the delay
problem, it seems to me that that would be, independent of everything else,
some kind of an improvement.
So I will put it this way. If you could keep quality and control delay and
spend less money on it, I’m in favor of that too.
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: Refinement noted. Josh?
JOSHUA D. SARNOFF: Sure. So let me pick up on this discussion and
relate it back to Actavis. Prosecutors spent something between $10,000 and
$100,000 acquiring patents. We litigate $5 million to $25 million over what
they mean and whether they’re valid and infringed. The solution is not
simply to give more money to the Patent Office, although I’m actually in
favor of that as well.
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: How about judges?
[Laughter.]
JOSHUA D. SARNOFF: I’m absolutely in favor—
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: The Motorola Mobility opinion is
207 pages. To set that price, I think we should get piecework here.
[Laughter.]
JOSHUA D. SARNOFF: You know, there’s nothing that says you can’t
impose as part of the damages award something coming back to you. So, in
any event—
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: Now you tell me.
[Laughter.]
JOSHUA D. SARNOFF: I’ll just give you one example, and here, I can
refer you to my amicus brief in the Phillips case29 dealing with claim
construction. It’s now effectively rewritten in somebody else’s cert. petition
in the Biosig case,30 which addresses that the standard for whether a patent
29

Phillips v. AWH Corp, 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) (overturning
the insolubly ambiguous standard).
30
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claim is valid is whether it is not insolubly ambiguous. It can be very
ambiguous, just not insolubly ambiguous, which means that you can’t know
what the scope of the property right is and whether it’s valid or infringed
until after you pay this guy to resolve it in court. That is the basic difference
between the patent system and most other forms of property system.
Okay. We’re going to say you can define the boundary, so long as you can
get to court and figure out where the boundaries are. If someone then asserts
that claim in court, the problem is you’ve got a misuse of the patent right,
where you ought to know that it actually doesn’t cover the thing you’re
asserting.
This brings us back to how are we going to actually do the evaluations in the
context of courts having to assess what value is being transferred. You’re
going to have to get, to some extent, into these difficult and costly questions,
$5 to $25 million in litigation cost before trial, to figure out whether or not
the patent was valid and infringed. It also turns out that the markets for
generics versus the pioneers are not perfectly elastic. This is being done in
many ways, including the agreements not to offer authorized generics by the
manufacturer as a way of transferring value to the generics during the term.
So you’ve got to think this through much more carefully, and this just makes
it more costly, and once again, take a cut because it’s going to come back to
the courts. You are going to have value whether or not these patents with all
of these complex doctrines are valid. But the best place to start on patent
validity—which is something the AIA really didn’t help at all with—is
clarifying claim scope.
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: Does the AIA provision allowing for
post-issuance review have anything to contribute to this? If it comes into
court, could I say I am going to send it over to PTO for a post-issuance
review, or could I engage them as my expert?
JOHN F. DUFFY: So you have two different problems with that. The first
is the one that Professor Epstein alludes to. If the court has already said, for
example, that the patent claim is invalid, then bringing it back into the Patent
Office and claiming it’s valid seems troubling, same thing with the other way
around.
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: I am talking about in terms of trying
to sort out a pay-for-delay case.
JOHN F. DUFFY: Right. One problem with that is that there’s a different
standard of claim interpretation that’s currently being applied in the Patent
Office on post-grant reviews. The Patent Office gives claims the broadest
reasonable interpretation. That standard is supposed to allow for more claims
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to be found invalid, but if they are upheld, then claims interpreted broadly
are more likely to be infringed. So if the Patent Office is asked to evaluate
the scope of claims, the Patent Office would have to adhere to the standards
used in making judicial determinations of claim scope. Otherwise, there
would be a disconnect between the judicial and administrative
determinations.
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: Because if they did say it’s not valid
even with a broad scope, that solves the problem.
JOHN F. DUFFY: No.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: Doug, it’s worse than that. One of the problems
is that the way in which you get federal judges today is kind of by a random
draw, because people are very nervous about the self-selection.
If you go into the PTO under the AIA, as best I can tell by reading it, is the
head of that court has complete discretion on appointing special judges on an
ad hoc basis in order to hear these cases. I regard that provision actually as
unconstitutional, because I think it’s an open invitation for bias, if in fact you
know what the patent is, you know what the claim is, and you know what
your friends are. So I don’t like that system of appointments. I would much
rather them have a stable of judges in a given area or people who can do this,
and then you pick them by lot in order to handle the case, because the effort
to sort of match it by way of ability seems to me to be much too much open
to real claims of bias, which are going to be very difficult to challenge after
the fact.
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: And bias, expertise. They get
confused.
JOHN F. DUFFY: I’ll just add one last thing. If it has to go to the court to
figure out what the claim means, you’re already too far in with too much
money on the table.
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: Commish?
JOSHUA D. WRIGHT: So I started, I talked mostly about PAEs, where I
think the punch line is going to rule of reason as taking us back to sort of a
normal antitrust mode. Let me make these remarks on something that I think
is going the other direction, where I think antitrust law and the enforcement
agencies are maybe—and at least there are the seeds of a departure from the
normal situation in which the agencies treat patents as property. Indeed,
that’s the language that appears in our 1995 licensing guidelines on IP, and I
think has been the traditional approach with horizontal agreements, with
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whether or not patents confirm market power, which the Supreme Court gets
right and says there is no presumption of that sort.
So, a couple of areas that I think are cause for concern that they are at least
seeds that the antitrust agencies, including my employer, are maybe heading
a different direction into a realm of special treatment for intellectual property
rights. Most of this goes to the injunction issue that Richard started with. I
think there has been some momentum inside the agencies for the view, and I
think a view that is quite contrary to the position that would occur in the
space of real property, that injunctions are suspect as a competitive matter, as
an antitrust matter. So, if you run down the line, most of these examples are
bootstrapping on the proposition that injunctions are competitively suspect.
It’s a proposition that I don’t think has been established and cannot be
established as a matter of economics or law. But, if you begin with that
presumption, then you can start to read through some recent agency activity,
settlements under the FTC Section 5 authority, a couple cases that occurred
before.
I started—or else I’d just be reading my dissent—that have to do with
assertions that the naked assertion of an injunction on a FRAND-encumbered
SEP violates Section 5 of the FTC Act. Couldn’t do it under the Sherman
Act. Couldn’t do it under the Sherman Act precisely because the conduct
would not be unlawful.
Merger review in which the competitive problem identified is that the postmerger firm, because it’s acquiring some IP, maybe it’s acquiring some
standard essential patents, well, it’s more likely to seek injunctions. Well, so
what’s your antitrust theory of harm? More likely to seek injunctions.
Injunctions are competitively suspect ergo the merger is more likely to harm
competition. It makes the post-merger firm more of a competitive problem,
bootstrapping on the problematic premise.
There are other examples, some popularity with the idea that a similar
merger example that would instead be a transfer of patents from a practicing
entity to a PAE would raise the same problems. Why? Because the PAE is
more likely to go get an injunction.
And finally—and I think related to the first example of the FTC cases—that
breach of a contract with an SSO instead is itself in particular breach of a
contract involving a FRAND commitment are presumptively
anticompetitive. Not presumptively inefficient, not presumptively breach of
contract, not presumptively some sort of other problem or non-problem, but
presumptively an antitrust violation, presumptively the result of the
acquisition of market power.
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I think putting some of those examples together, again, I think which all have
this one premise in common, are importantly a departure from the standard
approach or at least the beginnings thereof.
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: Okay. We have fourteen minutes for
some questions from you all. There is a microphone I see there in the center.
Just tell us who you are.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: And why you’re here.
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: And even if you think we already
know, it would be helpful.
ART MACOMBER: Good afternoon. Art Macomber. I’m a dirt lawyer
from Coeur d’Alene, Idaho, and I’m seeing some market similarities between
what we call in real property a “quiet title action,” which sometimes goes
along with a declaratory judgment, and I’m wondering if there’s such a thing
in patent law that we call “adverse possession,” especially perhaps related to
these paper patents that were mentioned, and how that gets resolved in the
patent system.
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: John, can you handle that briefly?
JOHN F. DUFFY: Sure. You want me to focus mainly on adverse
possession? With respect to adverse possession, we haven’t seen that really
in patent law, I think, because adverse possession usually requires that
someone have been in possession of the property in an open and notorious
way for something along the lines of two decades, which is the term of the
patent. Thus, the patent would expire anyway before adverse possession
could occur, so I don’t think we’ve seen that doctrine of real property
migrate into patent law.
I will say that there is a very interesting Supreme Court case this term on
copyright about whether the equitable doctrine of laches applies to copyright
infringement claims.31 The statute of limitations for copyright is sort of a
rolling statute of limitations, and there is an argument that laches might apply
if a course of infringement has been going on for years and years. The Ninth
Circuit held that the doctrine of laches did apply to bar an infringement claim
against a defendant who had been distributing a film—the film Raging Bull,
as a matter of fact—for years and years. The copyright holder in that case
knew about the potential claim for copyright infringement but nonetheless let
the infringement go on for years and years. The Ninth Circuit held that such
a claim could be barred forever by the doctrine of laches.
31

See Petrella v. MGM, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014).
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So I guess that’s the only place where I could see something like adverse
possession applying in intellectual property. I don’t know of anything in
patent law that’s similar, although laches occasionally has been seen in
patent law too. So I guess that’s where I’d look, not adverse possession. I’d
look to the doctrine of laches to accomplish something similar.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: And just one sentence. The reason why that
doctrine makes perfectly good sense is the issue of laches is something
within the control of the patent holder; whereas, many of the other defenses
under the eBay balancing tests are not.
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: Josh?
JOSHUA D. SARNOFF: One thing is that because this is non-rivalrous
property, you don’t get the same context. What you do get under patent law
is the denial of an injunction with a prospective royalty, effectively the same
thing, in a non-rivalrous patent property situation.
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: Interesting. Yes, sir.
SAM MIORELLI: I’m Sam Miorelli from Orlando. I’m a member of the
Practice Groups’ Executive Committee.
I’m wondering. A lot of this discussion has been about drugs, and
increasingly, we’re seeing these combination drugs where often something
immediately goes generic, and you see it combined with something that’s
still patented, like Vytorin, but also especially in the HIV treatment where
you have essentially a patient needs one drug out of—or three different
classes of drugs. And, we’re starting to see that if some of these have gone
generic, the two or three manufacturers won’t sell the generic as a generic,
and they require it to be in a combination a drug, Atripla, Truvada, these
other sorts of things. Essentially, they create a twenty- or thirty-year or
presumably you could even see like a forty- or sixty-year patent on these
drugs. You never see the public good, and I’m wondering how you see these
sort of antitrust issues potentially affecting that practice.
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: Would you say that’s similar to
evergreening and other ways, such as changing the shape, changing the
color, what have you?
SAM MIORELLI: Exactly. You see a minor refinement, and maybe the
slightly less refined version that was ninety-eight percent effective, you can’t
buy anymore, and now you have to get the ninety-nine percent effective
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combined with these other presumably generic drugs but still at sky-high
prices.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: And why is it that you can’t buy the ninety-eight
percent variety?
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: It’s dropped from the orange book.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: It’s because it’s dropped from the orange book,
right?
JOHN F. DUFFY: It’s government regulation.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: Yeah. And the point, it is not a patent problem.
Look, the FDA is supposed to tell you whether a drug is safe and effective.
Once it’s safe and effective, it remains safe and effective, even after it’s
dropped from the orange book. So the standard rule of patents ought to
apply, and the patent rule essentially is if you patent an improvement, you
cannot prevent anybody from using the unimproved drug at whatever price
you want, and so now it’s the FDA in restraint of trade with its orange book
regulations, and those ought to be changed forthwith.
JOHN F. DUFFY: And so the key there is not a patent problem. It is a
health care problem involving the intricacies of health care regulation, which
produced the opportunity for this. You don’t see evergreening even discussed
in any other area of technology.
JOSHUA D. SARNOFF: There are two other complexities. One is why the
generics didn’t move in to supply the third drug that went off the patent, and
that’s one concern that’s maybe a regulatory concern. The other is whether or
not they will sell—say there were three patented drugs all sold separately—
whether the brand manufacturer will continue to sell them separately, so
there is no benefit. That may raise some antitrust concerns, but the bigger
question is usually why the doctors where there’s no therapeutic increase are
now requiring the branded drug. That’s about bad medical practice and the
need for a regulation of the health care industry.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: Well, maybe, but, I mean, the difficulty in some
of those cases is that the small changes have huge impacts, and it’s really
very, very difficult to make some of these claims out until you actually know
what’s going on there. At this point, you get group buyers, HMOs,
professional organizations, hospitals, and to somehow assume that these
characters are buying products, which is more expensive, even though they
know it’s not better is, I think, a somewhat questionable one.
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JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: It does sound like the Soviet system.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: Oh, God, don’t get me—
[Laughter.]
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: The FDA is built like a Soviet tank. There’s no
question.
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: Hey, listen, I tried to make the point
in Abigail Alliance.32
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: Yes, we did. Some of us know. Amen, brother.
NICK CHIDIAC: Nick Chidiac. I’m the President of the George
Washington University Chapter.
So, Professor Epstein, in your comments with the quality of the scholarship
of the patents, it’s been talked a lot about scholars’ tendency to sort of zero
in on some sort of pore in the system and sort of miss some of the larger,
overarching effects. In regards to the reverse payment settlements, our
analysis usually starts well after a drug company has done a lot of risk
assessment, a lot of planning, a lot of investment, both developing the drug
and taking it to market, and after generic firms have individually and
probably decided whether to or not to file an ANDA. What are we missing in
terms of the overall economic dynamics?
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: Bright question. I have a modest proposal, which
I have made on other occasions to the horrific response of everybody, which
says let’s assume that what you get from a successful challenge under title—
paragraph 4 is a six month co-exclusivity period. My solution to all those
problems is let them cartelize the market for the period in question.
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: Just a second. We’re into HatchWaxman now.33 The first generic comes along, fails. Everyone else is
precluded, right?
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: Yes, for the six months.
And the reason is what you’re doing is you’ve got two margins to worry
about as well as administrative costs. The one margin is whether or not at the
32

Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach,
469 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
33
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
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time that the dispute is resolved there’s going to be increased levels of
competition, and my thing will preclude it. But on the other hand, you save a
bushel-load of expenses, because nobody has a test worth the powder to blow
it to hell on how you value the reverse settlement.
But on the other hand, there is another margin which if it turns out that you
think that pharmaceutical patents are (a) very solid generally and (b) too
short, adding six months to it may spur the initial creation, because even if
you’re challenged, it will be a little bit more valuable than before.
So given a full time evaluation, which is what you’re talking about, I see
very little reason to believe that we begin the analysis at the point of the
dispute and think it’s much more important to go back, and the best way to
challenge a patent is to encourage new entry by a substitute commodity, and
that can be done. If the new entrant knows that if his patent is challenged,
and he works out a settlement, he knows that he also gets six months. It’s a
little bit of what John constantly wanted to say. It’s that the action at the
front end protects you at the back end.
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: Next.
CRAIG FRATRIK: Hi. I’m Craig Fratrik, a student at Harvard Law
School.
I wanted to defend the difference, because it seemed like there was a decent
amount of agreement on intellectual property being a lot like real property,
and so differences that came to my mind, as you all have covered, is the
three-year waiting period to find out if you have the property is quite
different than if I construct something, I own it, or it is relatively easy—if I
sign the title to the land, then I know I own it right then.
And then the other big one was just locality. So it is relatively easy for you to
look at your house that you’re considering buying or investing retail in, look
at the registry, and then see if you own it. And coming from the—I was a
software programmer before—and coming from the software industry, it is
literally impossible to build a relatively simple website and then know if you
are infringing on someone else’s property rights.
So given those constraints, isn’t there some room left to distinguish
intellectual property from real property?
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: Well, this is my response to that question, since I
think it’s addressed to me. One of the reasons why we encourage patent
pools amongst complementary goods and cross-licensing arrangements is to
take these little bits of property and to make them into larger plots, to make
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them usable. You don’t have to do that with respect to land for the most part,
except under very unusual circumstances. For example, if you want oil and
gas leases, now the efficient magnitude is much larger than the farm, and you
have a lot of the similar kinds of assembly problems that need responses.
And on the other point, I think again you’re right. The attractiveness of a real
property system is that metes and bounds give you solid boundaries over
which you could work. Gary Libecap has done some wonderful work saying
where they don’t give you the standard coordinates with the surveyors but
use landmarks and so forth, the value of the real estate goes down by thirty
percent, precisely because of the insecurity of title.
And so Duffy may be right, or he may be wrong, on the question of how the
examination ought to work, but the key point is that you want to have a
system that gives you secure titles at the front end and allows for these crosslicensing arrangements, because if they are not secure, then forget about
litigation. Think first about licensing. The amount that you could get on an
insecure license or a mortgage or anything else is going to be very much less,
just as is in real property.
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: Josh Wright, briefly, and then one
last question.
JOSHUA D. WRIGHT: With respect to the symmetry point on property
and intellectual property, from an antitrust perspective, I think the answer is
the benefit of the symmetry approach of having the antitrust analysis treat the
two the same is not a claim that they are identical, and it’s not something that
hamstrings the agencies to say we have to pretend that this property has all
the same economic features as this one, no more than we do when we have a
case where there is a regulatory institution in the background or this market
is different than that market. So it’s allowing one to take the facts on the
ground but saying we don’t need a special set of rules. We don’t need a
different framework for analyzing. Our analysis is: see whether the conduct
at issue creates incentives that allow the acquisition of market power. Same
question.
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: We go off the air in one minute.
Your question, sir.
ATTENDEE: I’m Dave Border from the D.C. Young Lawyers Chapter. My
question is for Professor Epstein. Would you change the qualifications at the
PTO to hire patent examiners, and for Professor Duffy, what would your
private examiner certification look like?
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RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: Okay. My answer to the question is I’m not a
management consultant, and if the proposition is can we improve the Post
Office, the answer is surely yes. And what’s true of the Post Office is I also
think is true with respect to the PTO. But, it’s not going to be small
incremental changes you need. You need to have somebody come in there
with a new broom that will sweep clean.
JOHN F. DUFFY: And I think that new broom is privatization. I think
you’ll see a lot of different things. For example, I think you would not see
unionization of many of the private examination shops—
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: Oh. Oh, yeah. I—
JOHN F. DUFFY: Currently, the government agency’s examination shop is
largely unionized. I think that’s one thing that—
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN: No, but that’s unconstitutional, right? In any
sensible world.
JUDGE DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG: We’ve had a terrific panel. Please
thank them for me.
[Applause.]
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